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JURISDICTION OVER CAUSES OF ACTION
AGAINST INTERSTATE CARRIERS
By BERNARD C. GAVIT

L
The question of the jurisdiction of state courts over the person of interstate carriers and of causes of action against them,
when measured by the interstate commerce clause of the United
States Constitution, has recently received some judicial attention.
The Appellate Court of Ohio in the recent cases of Iron City
Produce Company and Albert M. Travis v. American Railway
Express Company' has decided that a statute authorizing service
of process upon a foreign corporation by the serving of summons upon a managing agent of the corporation doing business
in the state, as against an interstate carrier, is an unwarranted
interference with interstate commerce and, therefore, void under
the commerce clause of the Constitution. In those particular
cases, the causes of action arose out of transactions in states
other than Ohio, and the plaintiffs were not residents of Ohio.
The defendant carrier was not a resident of Ohio, but was actively engaged in business as a common carrier in that State.
The court decided that it was bound by the case of Davis v.
Farmers Co-OperativeEquity Company.2 Howeer, a recital of
the facts and decision in that case discloses the obvious conclusion that the Davis case was not at all a controlling precedent
for the Ohio court.
In the Davis case, the Supreme Court held that a statute authorizing service upon an agent soliciting business for an interstate carrier in Minnesota, construed by the courts of Minnesota
as compelling every foreign interstate carrier to submit to suit
as a condition for maintaining a soliciting agent within the state,
was invalid under the commerce clause where it compelled the
submission to jurisdiction over an action which arose outside of
that state and where neither of the parties were residents of
that state and where the defendant did not, in fact, operate or
maintain any portion of its transportation system within the
State of Minnesota. The decision is distinctly upon the ground
that the State of Minnesota could not compel a foreign corpora* See biographical note, p. 140.
1 151 N. E. 316.
2 262 U. S. 312, 67 L. Ed. 996, 43 S. Ct. 556.
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tion, engaged in interstate commerce, to submit to suits arising
outside of the State as a condition precedent to its right to maintain a soliciting agency in the State, it being admitted that the
right to maintain the agent was a necessary incident of the interstate commerce carried on by the company, and that there was
in fact an actual interference with the business of the company.
The Minnesota statute prohibited the doing of interstate business except upon conditions which the court found were unwarranted in law and in fact, and the statute was, therefore, a direct
attempt upon the part of the State to regulate interstate commerce. The legislation could only apply to interstate commerce;
and it was itself an interference with the rights of carriers
under the commerce clause.
IT.
The Ohio statute was quite different in its purpose and its
scope. It provided: "When the defendant is a foreign corporation having a managing agent in this state, the service may be
upon such agent." It could as well apply to intrastate business
as it could to interstate business. It created no direct interference with interstate commerce, and placed no conditions on a
carrier as to its right to do business in the state. Whatever
interference there was with interstate commerce was brought
about by the plaintiffs in bringing the suit in Ohio and attempting to obtain service under the statute. In the Minnesota case
the interference with interstate commerce was the result of the
attempt on the part of the state to make the carrier submit to all
character of suits before giving it the right to do certain business
in the state; and the actual suit in question was found as a matter of fact to be an unreasonable burden upon the interstate business of the carrier concerned. In the Ohio cases the interference
was not the statute itself, but the act of the parties, and there
was no finding that as a matter of fact the action of the parties
was an actual interference with interstate business.
There were two cases. In the first one the question had been
raised by a motion to quash the service for the reason that the
statute was void under the 14th Amendment and the Commerce
Clause; in the second the question was raised on a motion challenging the jurisdiction over the cause of action. The court
treats the second motion as being similar in effect to the first.
But it says in conclusion, "To hold that these actions may be
maintained and the service thereon may be made under favor
(sic) of Section 11290, General Code, would be to come in direct
conflict with the decision in the Davis case. We will therefore
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follow the decision in that case and hold that, in these cases,
Section 11290 is repugnant to the interstate commerce clause of
the Constitution of the United States and that the court did not
err in quashing the service." There being no showing or finding
of actual interference the result of the cases is that a state has
either no jurisdiction over a cause of action against an interstate
carrier or of the person of the carrier where the cause of action
arose in another state and the parties reside elsewhere. That
is, the jurisdiction of the State of Ohio over the cause of action,
or the person of the defendant, itself unreasonably interferes
with interstate commerce.
/

III.
Both courts sidestep the question as to whether or not the
defendants could successfully complain under the 14th Amendment. The authorities, however, are quite conclusive to the
effect that they could not.3
This would be particularly true in the Ohio cases, because after
all what the defendant was complaining about was the bringing
of the suit in Ohio, where the person of the defendant was present, without duress or condition on the part of the State of Ohio.
The prohibition of the 14th Amendment is solely against state
action. 4 If a corporation chooses to go into a state, and thereby
submits itself to the jurisdiction and processes of the courts of
the State, it cannot well complain that an individual uses those
processes to its embarrassment. The moving force is not the
5
State, but the individual.
The situation in regard to the Commere Clause is quite similar.
The Commerce Clause gives to the United States and takes away
from the State power to regulate interstate commerce. Nobody,
for instance, would suppose that the commerce clause itself made
stealing from interstate shipments a crime. Individual interference with interstate commerce might be unlawful under
proper legislation but it would not be unconstitutional. If an
interstate carrier chooses to go into a State to do business and
thereby submits itself to the jurisdiction and the processes of
the State without duress or condition on the part of the State, it
ought not to be able to successfully complain, for constitutional
reasons, if an individual uses those processes to its embarrass3 See the cases cited in the case of Davis v. Farmers' Co-Operative

Equity Company, 262 U. S.312, at pages 317 and 318.
4 "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."
5 But see, Hayman v. City of Galveston, 71 L. Ed. 416.
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ment. The moving force is not the state, but the individual.
Can it fairly be said that a state by merely allowing an individual
to use its courts is thereby regulating interstate commerce?
The Supreme Court, in the Davis case, is very careful to point
out that the statute itself, as interpreted and enforced, was an
interference with interstate commerce. That is, a state cannot
condition its personal jurisdiction over an interstate carrier in a
manner calculated to interfere with interstate commerce. The
Ohio court decides that a State has no jurisdiction over the person of an interstate carrier within its limits in a suit brought by
a non-resident on a cause of action arising elsewhere. That is
quite a different proposition.

IV.
It may be well to get the background of the law here involved
in order to see just how different it is.
The admitted general rule is, of course, that actions which are
of a personal or transitory nature, may be brought and maintained in any jurisdiction in which the defendant may be found ;6
although it is also true that any state or nation may refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction over a transitory cause of action where
the cause of action arose elsewhere and where neither of the parties are residents of the state where the action is commenced. 7
This is particularly true where the cause of action arose
under the laws quite dissimilar to the laws of the state where
the action is brought.8
The Constitution does not compel a state to furnish courts for
such a situation. 9 But the Commerce Clause requires the furnishing of reasonable court facilities for the enforcement of a
claim arising out of interstate commerce and against a citizen of
the state. 10
Ordinarily, jurisdiction which was accepted as valid under
the common law doctrines of conflict of laws, is also valid under
the Fourteenth Amendment."1 It would seem that if a situation
or legislation were not so unreasonable as to be within the protection of the 14th Amendment, that the same situation and the
6 Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch. 148.
7 Gardner v. Thomas (N. Y.), 14 Johns, Rep. 134; Burdick v. Freeman,
120 N. Y. 420.
8 Mexican National Railroad v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107.
9 Kenney v. Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S. 411, 64 L. Ed. 638, at p.
640.
lo Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 59 L. Ed. 193.
"1Den v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 15 L. Ed. 372.
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same legislation would not ordinarily be an unwarranted interference with or regulation of interstate commerce. There seems
to be some indication by the Supreme Court in the Davis case
that there is somewhat of a conflict between that case and the
St. Louis Southwestern Railroad Co. v. Alexander case,'2 which
held that a somewhat similar statute did not deprive a carrier of
property without due process of law.
V.
The anomalous part of the present situation and the decision
of the Supreme Court in the Davis case is that under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, Congress has recognized the validity
and reasonableness of the general rule as to jurisdiction over
transitory causes of action as applied to interstate commerce and
provides that "Under this Act an action may be brought in a
Circuit Court of the United States in the district of the residenc6
of the defendant or in which the cause of action arose or in which
the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action."' 13
This section has been held to authorize the maintenance of a
suit in New York on a cause of action which arose under the
Act in New Jersey where both the plaintiff and the defendant
were citizens of New Jersey and where the defendant was doing
business in New York as a foreign corporation under somewhat
similar circumstances and statutes as were involved in the Min14
nesota case.
Had the causes of action sued upon in the Ohio cases arisen
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the decision must
have been the exact opposite of what it was, for there was no
dispute but what the defendant was doing business in the State.
After all, the result of the Ohio case is that perhaps changing
circumstances and conditions now warrant a new doctrine of
conflict of laws which in effect creates a new standard for the
F6urteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause; i.e., the
courts are now ready to depart from the old rule that a transitory cause of action may be enforced in any jurisdiction where
the defendant may be found where in fact there is no real necessity or occasion for the bringing of a suit outside of the domicile
of the parties or in the jurisdiction where the cause of action
arose.
12227 U. S. 218.
13 Section 6, Employers' Liability Act, as amended April 5, 1910, 36
Stat. 391.
14 Connelly v. Central Railroad Co. of N. J., 238 Fed. 932.
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Such a new doctrine would only ingraft on the law of conflict
of laws an established rule of equity. There is admitted authority in a court of equity to restrain persons within its jurisdiction
from prosecuting suits in its own state or in other states where
the institution and prosecution of the suit in the foreign jurisdiction will work wrong or injury to others and where the prosecution of a suit in the foreign jurisdiction is vexatious. 15
The Davis case presented a situation where the plaintiff could
well have been restrained by the courts of his own state in maintaining the action in a foreign jurisdiction. Although there are
apparently no reported cases in Indiana on the subject, the trial
courts of Indiana have on several occasions, to the knowledge of
the writer, restrained the prosecution of a suit in Minnesota by
an Indiana citizen upon a cause of action arising in this state
and against a carrier who was only present in Minnesota under
the statute considered in the Davis case.
VI.
The Supreme Court in the Davis case is quite careful to limit
its decision to the actual situation in that case and as pointed
out above, the decision is clearly upon the point that the state
could not compel the foreign carrier to submit to jurisdiction of
vexatious lawsuits before it could be admitted to do business in
the state. The Ohio decision is quite different and holds that
whether or not the suit is in fact vexatious, the courts of Ohio are
prohibited by the Commerce Clause from entertaining the suit.
It may well be that the decision leaves the courts of Ohio without
any jurisdiction over any foreign corporation as the court distinctly holds the statute in its entirety to be void. Whether or
not rights under the statute in regard to intrastate business are
separable under the statute would be rather questionable. 16
VII.
A little reflection shows that the results of the Ohio case are
quite as arbitrary as the former rule. It seems to be admitted
by the Supreme Court of the United States and by the Appellate
Court of Ohio that if in fact the plaintiff were a citizen of the
state, it would then make no difference where the cause of action
arose and that the action could be maintained in the state of his
residence if the defendant could also be found there under the
15 7 R. C. L. 1070, Sec. 10..

Culp v. Wutler, 69 Ind. App. 668, 122 N.

E. 684.
16 See 6 R. C. L., p. 121, et seq.
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process statutes of the state; and that if in fact the defendant
were a resident of the state, the residence of the plaintiff and the
place giving rise to the cause would be immaterial.
There seems to be the further admitted exception that the state
where the contract of carriage was executed would also have
17
jurisdiction.
There may be two reasons for those exceptions. Either (1)
the plaintiff has a property right whose situs is in any one of
those three jurisdictions, and the denial of a remedy there would
violate the 5th or 14th Amendment; or (2) the commerce clause
protects only against unreasonable interference, and to allow a
plaintiff to pursue his remedy in any one of those jurisdictions
is not an unreasonable interference, although it be a more serious
inconvenience than the maintenance of the suit in a state which
is a stranger to the transactions and all of the parties.
The final outcome as regards the first reason may ultimately
depend on whether the cause of action arises out of interstate
commerce as such, and under specific federal legislation on the
subject, or whether it arises under the state law. That is, there
may well be a distinction between a cause of action in favor of
an employee under the Employers' Liability Act or of a shipper
under the Carmack Amendment and one arising out of a crossing accident, when Congress or the courts attempt to regulate the
venue of the action. If the cause of action is given under valid
Federal legislation under the Commerce Clause, then Congress
or the courts may reasonably regulate the venue ;18 if the cause
of action arises under state law then the plaintiff's right to pursue his remedy where he will might be protected to some extent
at least by the 5th and 14th Amendments.
VIII.
The situation is quite confused, but it is submitted that the
results of the Ohio case do not add much to the reason of the
thing nor assist much as a practical proposition in remedying a
bad situation.
Under the Ohio case, if a cause of action arose in Chicago in
favor of a citizen of New York and against the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, the action could not be maintained in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting at Hammond and within twenty miles of the City
17 Internctional Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth, 234 U. S. 579, 58 L.
Ed. 81479.
1 Estman Kodak Co. v. So. Photo Co., - U. S. -, 71 L. Ed. 423.
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of Chicago, but it could be maintained in either New York or
Pennsylvania, due to the fact that the plaintiff and defendant
were residents of those states, respectively. Actually, of course,
the inconvenience of trying the case in New York or Pennsylvania would be several times greater than the inconvenience of
trying the case in Indiana.
If the cause of action arose in Chicago in favor of a citizen
of New York and was against the Wabash Railway Company,
that action could be maintained in Indiana for the reason that
the Wabash Railway Company is an Indiana corporation, and
it could also be maintained in Illinois and New York.
If the cause of action arose in Chicago in favor of a citizen
of New York and was against the New York Central Railroad
Company, the suit could be maintained in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York, for the reason that the
New York Central Railroad Company is domesticated in each
state through which it passes and is a citizen of each of those
states. (Provided, of course, in each instance that it was not a
cause of action under the Employers' Liability Act.)
IX.
One hesitates to suggest any additional federal legislation, but
in view of the confusion which is certain to arise from the two
cases discussed in this paper, it would seem that the only rational
and certain method of settling the problem is some federal legislation as to the venue of actions against interstate carriers. 19
19 Since this article was written there have been at least three cases
decided which have some hearing on the points discussed. They are the

following: a. Hoffman v. State of Missouri, 71 L. Ed. 598. This was a
suit in Missouri against a Missouri Corporation, by a citizen of Kansas
upon a cause of action arising in Kansas under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
action could be there maintained, Missouri being the state of residence
of the defendant. Strangely enough the opinion does not cite the provision of the Act giving venue in just such a case to the State of Missouri,
but says that the case of Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Co. did not apply, and
that the defendant was not immune from suit merely because of inconvenience;
b. Nationa Liberty Izsurance Co. v. Trattner (Ark.), 292 S. W. 677.
This was a suit in Arkansas by a citizen of Missouri against a Missouri
corporation on a claim arising on Missouri under a contract executed there.

The corporation was doing business in Arkansas as a foreign corporation.
The local statute provided for service, and jurisdiction as to contracts

made and business done in the state. The court construed the statute as
giving jurisdiction solely over local business, but recognized the general
principle that a transitory action may he sued where ever the defendant

138
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might be found, saying however, that comity did not require it to take
jurisdiction over entirely foreign transactions and parties. The effect of
the decision is that the State will not exercise its jurisdiction over a
transitory cause of action unless some necessity for doing so appears;
c. Murman v. Wabash Ry. Co., 221 N. Y. S. 332.
This was a suit
in New York by a non-resident on a cause of action arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in Michigan and against an Indiana Corporation doing business in New York under exactly the same circumstances
as were involved in the Da is v. Farmers' Co-op. Co. case, supra. The
Court held that the defendant was doing business in New York within the
meaning of the New York statutes, and that under Sec. 6 of the Employers' Liability Act the venue was properly laid in that state. On principle the case is directly contrary to the Ohio cases.
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